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Behind, the Road is Blocked: 
Art Education and Nostalgia 
Paul Duncum 
Abstract 
Proponents of high culture have trusted its power as an 
antidote to contemporary social ills. However, art eduCiiton 
should be aware that the history of such attempts is a history of 
failure . It is a history of gradual marginalisation, both of the 
Cfitiqueand the critics,and of increasingly conservative political 
reaction. The crit ique represents, today as it has always done, a 
nostalgia for an idealized past. But the failure of the critique 
suggests that there can be no going back. It is argued that the 
increasing failure of this critique to positively influence social 
and cultural life is a warning that the future of art education lies 
elsewhere. As representative of this cri tique, this p<lperdiscus.ses 
the English cultural critics Edmund Burke, Matthew Arnold, F. 
R. Leavis and T. S. Eliot; the Frankfurt School Marxists 
Horkheimer. Adorno, and Marcuse; and the Postmodern French 
critic Jean Baudrillard . Finally, guidelines fo r a future . 
contemporary art education are advanced . 
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Behind, the Road is Blocked: Art Education 
and Nostalgia 
From the Picture-Study Movement o f the 19205 10 the 
proponents of DBAE with a neo-conservalive a~nda (Greer 
(19~), arl educators have attempted to offer high culture as an 
antidote to contemporary social lifel • Such efforts include, for 
example, Kauffman' s (1966) defence of fine art against popular 
art and Smith's (1986) promotion of the humanist ideal of art istic 
excellence. These proposals share a long and impressive history 
which includes many fi ne and courageous minds. But I will 
argue that t~e history of the intellectual forerunners of a high 
culture version of DBAE and associated proposals offer no hope 
for the future of art education. It is a history of fail ure, .Ind it 
should act .IS a warning to seek the future of art education 
elsewhere. 
I am referring to the tradition of high culture critiosm 
which, as traced by Williams (1958) and Johnson (1979), involves 
olfe~ng high culture IS a remedy to the ugliness of the physiul 
environment as well as to the atomizatio n, alienation 
stal'ldardiUotioft,and brutality which is said to havecharacteriud 
SOda l Ufe for the pasl 2C!O rears. The ~Igh culture SOdal critique 
has long been a detenrurung fa ctor 1ft the climate in which art 
education has been theorised and practiced. Pearson (1994) 
writes .that high culture forms the underlying paroildigm for art 
education. 
I will concentrate on the original proponoilnts of highcu.lture 
rather than examples of the derivitive form it takes in art theory 
~nd art eduction The intellectuiill bankruptcy and social 
Iff'tleva~ce Of th~ critique is made especially cle.u in this way, 
and the Imphcahons for art educoiltion that much more stark. 
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The notion of high culture began as part of wide ud 
general movements in thought and feeling, as a response and 
contribution to pressures associated with the Industrioill 
Revolution . Principally, these involved mechanization, 
urbaniulion (Bigsby. 1975, p . 6). the development of class 
consciousness, and agi tati on o n behalf of d e moc ratic 
representa.tion (Williams, 1958, p. xviii). II was part of the 
separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from the 
impetus of a new, Identifiably Modern society. The word s 
indwstry and art had previously referred to human attributes 
now came to signify specialised, and opposed institutions. 
Induslry. which had once meant sustained application came to 
mean manufactUring and productive institutions. And art, which 
had once denoted skill. came to mean a particular group of skills 
concerned with the imagination and creativity. Aesfhttic. had 
once denoted sense activity in general, the dulling and lulling 
included, but came to refer to the fine and beautiful, and, by 
association, to art (Williams, 1983). CwHurt, previously a word 
signi fying a process of human training,. became an abstraction, 
a thing in itself (Willia ms. 1983). At the same time, democracy 
and class emerged from Specialised use to focus attention on 
major realities of social life. Ind ustry, class, and democracy 
came to describe the external lerms of modern life: while culture, 
by contrast, referred in terms of opposi tio n to an area of personal 
experience, as did the new conceptions of aft and the aesthetic . 
In its continuing invocation by ilrt educators. the same 
dyn.lmics oiI.re d iscernible. Thereappears to be the same desire to 
create a calm space within an alleged impersonal and superfici.ll 
sod.lllife for the contemplation of aesthetic objects and human 
ingenuity. It is easy to translate the ea rlier opposition to 
democratic impulses to read the current suppression of other 
culturoil.1 voices. It isequally easy to translate for the ugliness and 
dehumaniution of industry. the current impersonalization of 
high technology, social fragme ntation, and informationoverlOoild . 
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The History of High Culture Criticism 
In the historical development of the concept of high culture 
and i~ continuing relations with the above social dynamics, 
three Interrelated themes emerge. Each offers a wolrning to 
proponents of oIn art education bued on high culture. The 
themes are: the groldua' margiNlisation of high culture social 
analysis; the gnduoll margiNlisation of high culture critics 
from centres of power and innuence; and the reactiona.ry, anti-
democra.tic political positions adopted by both socially 
progressIVe and conservative critics. These themes will be 
highlighted below by examining the tradition of English literary 
critics, in particular Edmund Burke, Matthew Arnold, F.R. Lenis 
and T.s Eliot. Alsoconsidered are the Frank.furt School Marxists 
Marcuse, Horkheirner and Adorno. Finally, the French 
postmodern critic Jean Baudrillard will be e:urnined . These 
critics are rarely identified in art education literature although 
Ralph Smith (1992) refers to himself as "an Arnoldian, pure and 
simple" (p. 72) but their contributions to the history of the high 
culture critique are seminal. They have been chosen as 
representative because each has made a substantive contribution 
to the history of the critique. While very different in orientation, 
each shares major ch.aracteristics of the high culture social 
crit~que: a distain for their own cultural period, contempt for 
ordmary people, and a regressiveand pessimistic view of histo ry 
characterised by nostalgia for the pa.st2. 
The critique characteristically views contemporary times 
as a muked decline from previous high standards and a more 
integrated and personally satisfying society in which these 
standards are alleged to have nourished. Thepoint of loss varies 
considerably. For the German Neo-Marxists Horkheirner &I: 
Adorno (1972/1944), it was pre-Fascist Europe, for Marcuse 
(1964) it was a pre-technological 19th century, for T. S. Eliot 
(1948) it was the old American South. Often it is aSsociated with 
the 18th century, although for 18th century writers like Edmund 
Burke it had already pa.ssed (Williams, 1958, p . 259-260). Alwilys, 
conditions conducive to high culture have been eroded (p. 259). 
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Since the ideals of this critique belong to previous periods, 
the critique is nostalgic for the past and melancholic about the 
present. In this, the espousal of high culture has impressive 
precedence. In cJilssical times, nostalgic melancholia was 
associated with intellectual life, and in the 17th centurynostalgia 
was regarded as a moral virtue of the intelligent person who, in 
response to the hOlTors of the world, withd.rew into melancholic 
despondency (Stauth &: Turner, 1988). Reflecting this view, 
Nietzsche saw intellectual life as "'a restful response to the 
everyday world of taste, emotion, feeling ilnd reciprocity'" (po 
519). For Nietzsche intellectual life was motivated not only by a 
desire todiS<!riminate, but resentment towards the masses. And, 
as described below, as the golden age of the high culture critics 
diminishes farther and futher and present conditions 
increasingly worsen, melancholia deepens, resentment increases, 
withdrawal accelerates, and hope diminishes until , with 
Biludrillud, there is nothing but disgust, despair, and apathy. 
In diagnOSing our own times, Baudrillolfd (1988) unwittingly 
says much about his own critique: "'When the real Is no longer 
what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is 
a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality" (p. 171). 
The English Literuy Critics 
In England, these general developments can be illustrated 
with reference to just four of its most prominent critics. As 
Williams (1958) shows, Burke was among the first of the English 
literary critics to offer the critique (p. 3). Writing in the late 18th 
century when only the first signs of industrialisation and 
democratic agitation were appuent, his critique was offered in 
termsof iln older England, though one still within living memory, 
ilnd the temper of his comments is affirmative (p. 11). Burke was 
a political conservative, and his espousal of refined sensibility 
was part of his condemnation of both the call for democracy and 
the progress of the industrial revolution; his critique involved 
an attack. on individualism and advocacy of the benefits of 
political gradualism and social constraint. A true believer in the 
original Enlightenment project, his goal was human perfectibility 
(Williams, 1958, pp. 3-12). Such is his confidence that he identifies 
the upholders of traditional standards with the existing state, 
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albeit somewhat idealized (pp. 120-123). No such confidence is 
shared by his predecessors. 
What for Burke were misgivings about the potential of 
industrialisation and agitation on behalf of democratic 
representation were, fo r Arnold, developing but already 
pervasive social realities. Arnold' s tone is consequently 
a]together more defensive, at times unworthy of his own ideals 
(pp. 116-117). Writing in 1869, he frequently adopts a priggish 
even malicious tone. And although his vision is grand, liberal 
and optimistic about the possibilities for social change, it is 
linked to a reactionary view of the need lor political repression. 
For Arnold, culture was foremost a meansof controlling growing 
social unrest among the working class through ideological 
incorporation Oohnson, 1979, p . 26). 115 purpose was to subvert 
dissent, as religion had d one previously (Thompson. 1963). By 
entwining ilself with the deepest rools of humanity, culture was 
to become the new religion (Eagleton, 1983, pp. 23-24). Arnold 
envisaged withholdingdemoaatic rights from those who sought 
such righls until they were brought inlo a basic ideological 
accord with those currently in power. 
In Clillwrt IIn4 Am:m:hy (1869/1891) Arnold argued that 
culture represents "the great hope out of our present difficulties" 
(p . viii), a way "to safety" (p. 157). He advocated culture as a 
defence against the rampant, anarchistic individualism of both 
the middle class and wo rking class (p. 10). As well, culture was 
conceived as.a buttress against "outbursts of rowdyism" (p . 38) 
from the working class in their pursuit of democratic rights. The 
tille of his texl focuses his position, contrasting the goal of 
colledive perfection with Individualism and mob rule. Culture 
is offered as the solution to the social fragmentation, banal 
standards, and mech.i.nical w.J.Ys of thinking S.J.id to follow from 
industrialisation and the decline of religion. Itisalso the solution 
to the dangers inherent in what he fears is a person' s "right to do 
what he likes; his right to march where he likes, threaten as he 
likes. smash as he likes" (p.37). 
There could be no question of identifying the existing state 
with the custodians of culture. H is ideal state was to be comprised 
of a "remnant'", of "aliens'", who had escaped the habits of class 
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prejudice. He seems to have believed that such a state WAS 
achievable, and he placed great store in education as a means of 
achieving social rec:onstruction Uohnson, 1979. pp. ).4·38). 
Like Burke there is no doubting the breadth of Arnold's 
vision. Culture involved "a harmonious expansion of huma~ 
nature" {Arnold, 1869/1891. p . IO) through thesludyand PUrsUit 
of perfection. A1though the direction of the Enlightenm~t pro~ 
had become I"s direct than it was for Burke. Arnold is Its herOIC 
champion. He exhorted his contemporaries to study and pursue 
hu.rnan perfection 
by getting to know on all matters which most concern 
us the best which has been thought and said in the 
world • .and through this knowledge turning a stream 
of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and 
habits. (p. viii) 
He sought (ultu.re "through reading, observing. and 
thinking'" (p . 49) with "a passion for pure knowledge, but also 
the moral and social passion for doing good'" (p . 6). 
His was an altogether grand view, but in dealing with the 
present and immediate future Arnold did . not escape the 
prejudices of his own class. H~advocated equal.lty, and although 
his attitude tow.ard the working class was ambivalent (p. 25), he 
feared them deeply. Democracy. he argued should be gained 
only "by the due course of the law" (p. 161). Ev~n while 
acknowledging the plaUSibly good cause of the working class, 
he felt able to write that 
monster processions in the streets and forcible 
irruptions into the parks ... ought to be unninchingly 
forbidden and repressed. (p. 158) 
Leavi.s· vision is altogether more restricted than Arnold's. 
Writing from the early 19305 into the 19705, he was by com~~50.n 
backward looking, deeply embattled. and largely pessimistic 
about the future . For Leavis, the Enlightenment project had 
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become highly problem.atic. The temper of his writing w.as th.at 
of.a pseudo-.aristocr.atic .authorit.ari.an (Willi.ams, 1958, p . 25n. 
Over the yeus,.as industri.alis.ation and democracy where felt to 
thre.a ten his position even furthe r, his work wu "maned 
increasing' y by a sense o f frustration and d esper.alion" (johnson, 
1979, p . 93). He condemned contempor.ary society without 
qualific.ation, .a position which offered no me.ans of soci.al 
eng.agement (Eagleton, 1983, p . 43). 
In Majority Ciuifiullio" nil Mi"orily Csdtw,e (1930) Leavis 
reduced the notion of cultu.re from .a gener .. ' sensibility to 
speeific works. While his cultural minority was charged to p rofit 
by work expressing the finest consciousness of the age (p . 4), the 
emphuis was placed o n the responSibility "to keep .. live the 
subtlest and most perishable parts of tr.adition" (p. 5). Leavis 
believed that the " plight of culture .... (wasl much more 
desperate'" in his own time than in Arnold's, comparing the 
environment in which Arnold had worked as "uncongenial" 
with his own as "'hostile" (pp. 3, 25). F .. ced with powerful 
institutions produc ing the modern press, advertising, 
broadcasting, films and consumer dur .. bles (pp. 6-10, 20, 24), he 
s.aw culture on a "downward .. cceleralion", in "a crisis" and "cut 
off unever before from the powers that rule the wOrld" (pp 31, 
5,25). 
Animating Le.avis' crit ique is a contrast between a sm.all 
minority culture .and .. society where industrialisation .and 
democ ra cy were equally triumphant . Mass society was 
standardized, Americanized, and characterized by a gener.al 
"levelling d own" of st.andards and the "deliberate exploitation 
of the cheap response" (l.eilvis, 1930, pp.8, 11 ). 
In consequence, l.eavis is unable to conceive of anything so 
splendid ly speculative u a classless remnant. His cultural 
minority is an educated elite concerned with acquiring tu te 
(Leavis, 1930, pp . 4-5, 11 -25). And instead of looking to a fu lure 
id eal state, Le.avis fights a rearguard aClion, seeing no re.al signs 
for iI better future (pp. 31·32). 
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His later work Involves a fierce hostility to populu 
educ.ation and implac .. ble antipathy to the "transistor ... and 
student participation in higher eduCilltion" (Eagleton, 1983, p . 
43). While Arnold admitted no distinction between culture and 
democracy, Leavis· first allegiance was to culture. 
Eliot's allegiance to high cultu.re is even more specific than 
Leavis' and his tone is even more sour, ilt times "dogmatic to the 
point of insolence" (Williams. 1958, p . 232). Eliot's(1948) critique 
is anogantly elitist for his primary concerns are to protect elite 
culture from "d eterioration in the upper levels'" (p. 6) and to 
reestablish an authoritative, guiding role for the intellectual 
cultural producer in society (johnson, 1979, p . 129). Adopting an 
essentially feudal vision of society, he sought to legitimate the 
cultural dominance of .. n older ruling class Oohnson. 1979, pp. 
125-129). In essence, his critique was an authorit .. rian, right 
wing, fimtastical mythology which was utterly unrelated to 
social realities (E"gleton, 1983, pp. 39, 41). Eliot (1948) believed 
that it is an essential cond ition of the p reservation of the quality 
of the culture of the minority, that is should remain to be a 
minority culture. (p. 107) 
As a class based society was "natural" (p. 20), high culture 
and egalitarianism were necessarily opposed (p . 16) . 
Consequently. he envisaged a cultural elite which was to be 
attached to, and interactive with, the dominant social class (p . 
42) in an organically functioning, hierarchically ordered society. 
He proposed. 
a form of society in which an arislocncy would have 
a peculiar and essential function, as peculiilll and 
essential as the function of any other part ... in which 
there be, from " lop · to "'bottom" , a continuous 
gradation of cultural levels. (p . 48) 
The upper levels would not possess more culture thiln 
lower levels, but rather would represent a more conscious and 
specialised. culture (p . 48). The elite was to be composed, like 
other social and culturalleveis, of "groups of filmilies persisting 
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from generation to generation each in the same way o f life" and 
settled in the ,..me geographic Io<:ality (p. 52). The different 
levels were not to be shared, but would nourish the others (pp. 
35, 37), just as different regionill cultures were to "'enrich 
neighbouring areas" (p. S4). The overall organizing principle 
was to be "unity and diversity" (chap. 3), with just suffident 
"friction'" to ensure "'c:reativeness and progress'" (pp. 58-59). 
Each class, cultural level and geographic area were to funct ion 
for the benefit of the whole. 
In short, a feudal aristocracy was once again to be 
responsible for the moral and social welfare of its people 
(Johnson, 1979, p . 125). Eliot stridently opposed me.ritocracy 
and uniformeducation (1948, pp,36, 101 l and focused his critique 
against a welfare state, the mass media, and working class 
institutions and ideas. And whereas Leavis and Arnold held 
liberal sympathies towards what they regarded as the social 
oppression and cultural devastation of ordinary people 
(Swingewood, 1977, p. 10), Eliot, despite o<:casionaJ references 
to exploitation and usury (1948, pp . 65, 104), conveyed a distinct 
lack o f concern for anyone other than those on top of his sodal 
and cultural hierarchy (Johnson, 1979, p . 126). 
Thus can be seen from these four examples, which span 
nearly two centuries, a growing sense of despair, brave, albeit 
narrow visions, which finally dissipated into filntasy . Thecritique 
follows this road: from the enlighte.nment of the many to the 
enlightenment of the few, to an apartheid of the enlightened few 
from the many. 
The Frankfurt School Marxists 
The most d eveloped Marxist onslaught on contemporary 
life from a high cultural perspective is that o f the Frankfurt 
School (Laing, 1978, p. 106). Like the.ir English counterparts 
discussed above, their influence on social critidsm has been 
profound . As Neo-Mar:dsts these critics too were heirs of the 
Enlightenment project. but writing during the middle of the 
20th century they, like Leavis and Elio t, knew it to be highly 
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problematic and li~ited . The~ atta~ked technol0s.tcal p~gre~s, 
holding it responSible for ahenation and one dlmenslonailty 
(Marcuse, 1964). Traditional transmitters of cultures, particularly 
the family, were thought to have been weakened (Swingewood, 
1977, p. 14), and, lamentably, the moral organisational strength 
of the working class was thought to have d issipated (Laing. 
1978, pp. 106-107). 
For Horkheimer and Adorno (t944/19n), this critique is 
an integral part of their attempt to reconcile the contradiction 
that while according to Marxist orthodoxy the timetable for the 
collapse of capitalism was well nigh, the European proletariat of 
the 1930'5 was further than ever from a revolutionary 
consciousness. In liberal, capitalist demo<:racies the fire for 
socialism had waned, while elsewhere it had been subvertl!'d 
altogether by Fascism. Atomized and amorphOUS, the working 
class had proven easy prey to irrational persuasion. Indeed, 
fasci sm seemed to derive its support from below, from within 
the masses. 
Horkheimer and Adorno generalised from German Fascism 
to capitalist, liberal democracies as a whole, arguing that what 
the fascist s tilte d id through force, though in collaboration with 
the masses, the capitalist did through the "'culture industry" 
(Swingewood. 1977, pp. 12-18). They regardl!'d the media as a 
major weapon in the struggle to conceal the contradictions 
iMeTent in capitalism and to legitimate the capitalist' s dominant 
power. The media achieved ideologica.1 incorporation by 
supplying an unrelieved diet of anaesthetizing, distracting and 
falsifying fare from which all oppositional ideas were excluded . 
The media was considered imposed from ilbove, although the 
masses were seen ilS willing dupes (Swingewood, 19n, p, 13) In 
the sadomasochism with which the media held their audiences 
(Laing, 1978, pp. 9, 101). 
Donald Duck in the cartoons and the unfortunate in 
real life get their thrashing so that the audience can 
learn to take their own punishment. (Horkheimer ok 
Adorno, 1944/19n, p . 112) 
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The only realm in whi(h opposition was thought to still 
exist was among the arti s ti( avant-garde and those who 
maintain~ an unconlil minated, traditional cu !ture. Cui ture was 
viewed 115 
a protected realm in which ... tabooed truths could 
survive in abstract integrity remote from the society 
which suppressed them. (Marcuse, 1964, p . 64) 
Thus, for the Frankfurt School, like their 20th century 
English Iiteruy counterparts, the guardians of high culture 
were a small and embattled minority. Both the Frankfort School 
and the English literary critics were nostalgic {or past times and 
pessimistic about the future . 
Baudrill.J.rd 
All previously discussed critics were indebted to the 
Enlightenment projec t, however increasingly limited they 
comidered it, and following this each explicitly assumed a 
distinction between high and popular culture. Baudrillard does 
neither, and ostensibly his position is the antithesis of high 
culture criticism because he claims to reject completely any 
remnant of the Enlightenment project and with it any socially 
redemptive role for the high uts (Harvey, 19891. 
However in several ways he is the heir of the high cul ture 
tradition. He uncompromisingly denigrates the "masses" and 
develops an historical narutive whereby present conditions 
have displaced periods of greater certainty and hope. 
Throughout, Baudrillard's tone is that of the most profound 
repulsion. In these several ways a regreSSive view of history, 
condemnollt ion of o rdinary people, .tond a repulsed tone his 
cri ticism of contemporary social life c.ton be seen to stollnd at the 
end of the same tradition as discussed above. 
Unlike Eliot and Marcuse, however, who sought to erect 
w.tol1s to help preserve their precious high culture from 
containinolliion, Baud rillard is forced by the realityof his cultural 
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period - in common with most postmodern theorizing (Huvey, 
19891- to aCknowledge tNot the w.tolJs have tumbled down .tond 
that distinctions between high and low culture no longer m.toke 
sense. There is no longer a high culture to which one can seek to 
return. 
Whereu Eliot was able to fantasize, however bizarrely, 
about a minority culture, and the Frankfurt School Maf)(ists 
pinned their hopes on the avant-gude, Bolludrillard feels so 
overwhelmed by the plethora of disconnected images that 
chuacterize our time tNot he offers nothing but resignation and 
sell-indulgence. Thus, he marh wh.tot seeMS likely to be the Jast 
gasp of the high culture critique .tond with it , its demise into utter 
futility. In offering no hope for soci.tol intervention,the critique 
fin.toUy renders itself incap.toble of offering a response to 
contemporollry lile other than .topollthy .tond excess. Indeed, he sees 
apathy as the sole remaining means to resist the perpetr.totors of 
popul.tor culture (B.toudrillud, 1988, p . 208). 
Baudrillud' s original contribution is to proclaim the 
dissolution of the distinction between the real and the illusory. 
Once, he .torgues, culture reflected a basic reality, then it hid tNot 
b.tosic reality, then it hid the absence of reality, but now culture 
signifies nothing (1988. p . 1701. All that now exists is 
representolltion. One o f his chief arguments is the proliferation of 
the popular arts (1986), and their ability to seduce, overwhelm, 
intoxicate, and deliver us in to a state of "hyperreali ty. " Everyday 
life Nos berome aesthetized, enveloped in .ton aesthetics of the 
surface where d iscrimi nation has been replaced by revelry. 
Baudrillard too seems nostalgic for the past. He rages against 
what he considers the passing of meollningful and depthful 
experience. 
Ba ud.rillud (1986) relentlessly C.Jstigates postmodern times 
olInd vilifies the users of contempor.tory mass culture. In The 
Ecstllsy 0/ Communication (986), contemporary cul ture is 
repea tedly seen in terms of "pomogr.tophy", "obscenity"', and 
"excrement"'. Television is "like a microscopic pornography of 
the universe, useless. excessive, just like the sexual close up in a 
porno film" (p. 130). In terms that owe much to Horkheimerand 
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Adorno, Baudrillard (1983) sees the masses., blindly consuming 
all that is offered ;lind as having nothing to say in response. They 
are "spongy"', representing"a social void", in a stateof "inertia", 
and like an "opaque nebula whose growing density absorbs all 
the surrounding energy and light rays, to collapse finally under 
its own weight, a "black hole which engulfs" everything (pp. 1-
4). The bhlck hole absorbs all meaning. information, and 
communications and renders it mnningless. The ma55eS refuse 
to accept and produce mea.ning; In the face of constant 
bombardment by television, newspapers, cinema, videos, 
spectacles and so on, the masses are as indifferent and apathetic 
as the cultural materiallhey absorb is meaningless. 
Baudrillard is ostensibly from the left he was originally a 
Neo-M alXist but his work readily serves the in te.rests of reaction. 
As Harvey (1989) IlgUes, whe.n critique diS50lves into apathy 
and ethics dissolve into aesthetics, charismatic politics are 
unhindered and fascism is not far from the door. As Sietz (1990) 
has asked, '"Is it possible that some clever postmodem expert at 
the CIA (or KGB) invented 'Baudrillard' ?". Like Arnold and 
leavis, both liberals, whose work was malTed by reaction, 
Baudrillard' s critique is easy prey for the forces of repression he 
would presumably abhor. Thus does the tradition of high culture 
begin with a conservative politics and increasingly move, either 
explicitly as with Eliot or by consequence as with Baudrillard, 
toward fascism. 
Summ4lry 
Baudril1ard's metaphor of a black hole is more aptly aimed 
at the invocation of high culture. For those who would tum to 
high culture as a remedy for contemporary social ills, the history 
of the high culture critique offers a salutary lesson. To promote 
high culture in opposition to democratic impulses and the 
plurality of other voices, as a safehaven from an otherwise 
unsafe world , is to be marginalized ever more from an 
engagement with the cultu ral life of our period. It isa nost;lligic 
indu.lgence in an Idnl which on examination melts into air, a 
withdrawal into a past which never existed . Not only is the road 
behind us blocked, there is nothing to which we can return. We 
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need to face the present. Arnold (1869/1891) was right in this: 
"We need to turn a stream of frf!$h and free thoughl upon our 
stock notions and habits" (p. viii). 
Free and Fresh Thought 
What today would constitute free and fresh thought for art 
~ucation? If high culture represents a dead end, what road are 
we 10 tr.avel upon? 
I have elsewhere explored the sign posting (or an art 
~ucation which would offer positive ways 10 engage with our 
cultural epoch(Duncum, I990, 1993). Positive engagement means 
being viewed by television-wise, computer-literate students as 
having something meaningful to say in the world they inhabit. 
In place of high cuitu.re, I offer Ihe semiotic view of culture as 
those artifacts and practices through which we make meaning 
on an everyday basis. 
In my view the road ahead issignposted with propositions 
like the following: Different (ultural forms should be seen as 
categories nol evaluations. Simple and hierarchical dIstinctions 
between high and low culluff must give way to an understanding 
that cultural forms serve a multitude of often subtle and complex 
functions for differe.nt people in different contexts. A broad, 
inclusive definition of the visual arts is necessary. Rather than 
confined to the fine arts, visual arts education needs to become 
what Pearson (1994) has called an "education in pictures". Instead 
of viewing art as socially privileged, we need to view our subject 
as the pictures which saturate and inform our students' IiVf!$. 
Instead of art being regarded as something special, imagery 
should be considered as ordinary as everyday speech. Like 
ordinary language, itls through commonplace imagery that the 
real battlegrounds for people's hearts and minds are fought. 
Instead of viewing cultural forms omnipotently, they need 
10 be viewed from an insider's position. If stude.nts are to take 
notice of our views and value our knowledge, we must be 
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familiar with their own views and their often prodigious, albeit 
decontextualised knowledge about imagery. 
Rather than culture being imposed from above, culture 
should be seen to emerge from and serve people's fundamentill 
needs. People should be seen not as passive consumers of culture, 
but asilctive disc:ri.minators. insteild of seeing contemporilry life 
as atomised, culturililife should be u.nderstood as profoundly 
social, or.s Enzenberger (1974) puts it, " .I social product made 
up by people; its origin is the dialogue" (p.5). 
In place of seeing contemporary life ilS marking a decline in 
sod.l and cultural s tandards, it needs to be acknowledged thilt 
contemporary cultural forms have numerous precedents. There 
is nothing new in ce:lebuting the trivial, senSiotionill and ilbsurd . 
Simililfly, the fine arts hilve no monopoly on the profound. 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged thilt present times 
aTe informed by far more enlightened views than in the put on 
a wide rilnge of issues, Including religious affiliation, race, age, 
gender, and sexual preference. Far from representing a decline, 
present times present new chilUe.nges. ThHe include new 
technologies and pluralist and fragile social fonnations, as well 
as enormous concentrAtions of media power . We ilTe challenged 
to critically embnce television, video And computer games, for 
example, and to be ready for the information highway. We are 
challenged to accommodate numerous competing voices Ii lera II y 
j mages from different groups as they vie for power and infl uenee. 
Rather than privileging aesthetic delight, the visual arts need 
foremost to be seen AS sights of ideologicAl struggle in which art 
eduCiltors have the potential to playa central role. 
Theroad ahead isstrewn w ith difficulties, but in negotiAting 
them lies our future . And besides, there is no choice. The rOAd 
behind is blocked. 
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Notes 
1. I do not wish to imply that nowadAyS illi proponents of 
DBAE can be seenAS neo-conservatives. Rather, I wish to indicate 
that earlie.r fonnulations of DBAE were deeply conservative in 
both content and mode of delivery. 
2. Other feiltures of the high culture critique which they 
each share is an outsider's perspective to the culture they 
condemn and their propensity to rely on rhetoric rather than 
facts. The highly literate Arnold had assumed that an illiterate 
culture was inferior; Adorno, the European, cla ssically trained 
music critic, condemned American Jazz (Horkheimer &: Adorno, 
1944/1972); and the French intellectual Bilud rillard (1988) 
condemns American cu.lture in generAl and Disneyland in 
particular (pp. 171·172). The English literary critics as much as 
the Frankfurt School fililed to define their bilsic terms. Arnold 
spoke frequently of "sweetness and light'" as defining terms of 
culture but nowhere defines these terms Oohn50n, 1979, p . 33). 
Eliot's definitions break down because he is u nwill ing to ilIustra Ie 
(Williams, 1958, p. 231) and Leavis and Marcuse both assume the 
reader simply undef$tand, wha.t is meant by culture (see Leavis, 
1930, p. 5; Marcuse, 1978, p . x). Similarly, BAudrillard's fails to 
define major terms, uses hyperbolic and declar.J.tive Iilngul.ge. 
and ignores contradictory evidence (Poster, 1988, p . 7) 
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